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The extremely high A- share under-pricing in China’s primary market provides us 
with a very interesting area of empirical research. Previous studies on China’s IPO 
underpricing have been suggestive, but in-conclusive. A significant decline in A- 
share underpricing is found in 2003 relative to previous years (and much less than that 
recorded in the literature to date). We examine the validity of previous A- share 
underpricing models, reported in the literature, and find a statistically significant 
structural break in the data during 2003 when these models are specified. We further 
explore conflicts of interest in the Chinese IPO market and specify an alternative 
model to further examine this change in observed market behaviour. Our results 
suggest that a contract with high underwriter’s fee leads to less A- share underpricing. 
Our results also suggest that the asymmetric information hypothesis does not apply in 
the Chinese IPO market in 2003. Overpricing by the secondary market and the trading 
activity on the first trading day are the main functions of the A- share underpricing. 
This study has important implications such as guiding the Chinese government policy 
regarding the regulations of Initial Public Offering.  
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  11: INTRODUCTION 
Although book building has been allowed in China since early 2000 and accounted 
for 16.7% of IPO pricings during 2000-2002 no Chinese IPO’s were priced by this 
method during the first part of 2003. During this latter period all of the IPO’s were 
priced by the fixed pricing method. The secondary market pricing method was 
introduced in the middle of 2002 and 93.6% of IPO’s were processed via this 
placement method for the available data during 2003. In response to the move towards 
book building in 2004 it seems worthwhile to revisit the structure of the market and 
explanations behind Chinese IPO under pricing during the period preceding this 
move. The most recent database available at the time of the move towards book 
building has been used in conducting this study.  
The objectives of this paper are 1) to investigate the underpricing degree of China’s 
A- share IPO after 2002 and compare it with the results of previous empirical studies 
on Chinese IPO underpricing; 2) to test whether there is a structural break in previous 
models in explaining the A- share underpricing; 3) to determine which factors 
influence the Chinese IPO underpricing degree pre and post 2002. A modified 
Chow’s test was performed to find the structural break in the Chinese primary market 
and Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression was used to determine the factors 
influencing the underpricing level. For simplicity, we use the A- share underpricing 
and China’s A- share IPO underpricing interchangeably.  
IPO underpricing or IPO first- day return means that the closing share price on the 
first trading day after a company goes public is above the offering price, on average. 
Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) reviewed more than 30 studies of IPOs in 25 
countries and found underpricing exists in every country; most of all, China’s A- 
share has the highest underpricing degree in the world. Ritter and Welch (2002) 
summarize similar results from international studies of IPO underpricing. They argue 
that asymmetric information is not the primary factor of many IPO phenomena and 
believe research into share allocation issues is the most promising area of IPO 
research. A number of empirical studies have been done on China’s A-share 
underpricing. All of those studies have shown that China’s IPO underpricing degree is 
significantly above 100%. A general pattern of underpricing, Su and Fleisher (1999) 
949% during 1987-1995, Mok and Hui (1998) 289% during 1990-1993, Yang (2003) 
285% between 1991-2000, Gu (2003) 217% during 1994, Chi and Padgett (1995) 
129% between 1996 and 2000 and Liu (2003) around 140% during 1999-2002, 
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Thus, it will be interesting to see the recent A- share underpricing degree. While the 
previous studies have investigated the A- share underpricing degree up to 2002, we 
contribute to the China A- share underpricing literature by providing evidence pre and 
post 2002.  
While China is moving towards a purely market- oriented economy from a formal 
central- planned economy, the underlining infrastructure has been undergoing 
constant reform. Meanwhile, the IPO market evolution has been taking place as well. 
The introduction of Securities Law of People’s Republic of China in 1998 is the 
cornerstone of China’s security market reform. The law actually sets the benchmark 
for the market regulation development.  The objective of market regulation has been 
transacted since then: at the beginning, the communist leadership laid down a course 
of regulation oriented towards promoting quick market expansion and supporting 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs)  whilst sacrificing consistent regulatory standards 
(Heilmann, 2002); now, the law specifies that the regulation should be oriented 
towards standardizing the issuing and trading of securities, protect the lawful rights 
and interests of investors, safeguard the economic order and public interests of society 
and promote the development of the socialist market economy. As the evolutions and 
standardization of stock offering behavior of stock companies are achieved principally 
through a series of offering rules set by regulators, we argue the offering rule is the 
basic factor that influences stock offering behavior and the A- share underpricing. We 
suspect that previous models may not be able to explain the underpricing as long as 
the market is undertaking constant evolution.  
While previous Chinese IPO literature has show that the share allocation method is a 
driver of A- share under pricing, all of them focus on China’s unique allocation 
method. Our contribution here is to test the theory of allocation of shares based on 
conflicts of interest between the issuers and the underwriters. 
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 summarizes the unique institutional 
characteristics of China’s stock market; in particular, the ongoing reform of China’s 
IPO offering rules after 2000; section 3 reviews various Chinese literature on IPO 
under-pricing; section 4 details the data and methodology; section 5 introduces an 
estimated model explaining A- share underpricing, tests whether a structural break 
occurred in the previous model and develops an extended model to explain the 
  3structural break in the Chinese IPO market and subsequent fall in underpricing and 
section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2: THE UNIQUE INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF THE CHINESE STOCK 
MARKET    
At its initiation, the development of China’s security market aimed at supplying 
capital to SOEs and improving the corporate governance of those SOEs through 
market discipline. The establishment of China’s two stock exchanges, the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in December 
1990 and July 1991, respectively, is the landmark of the development of China’s 
financial market. There is no functional difference between the two stock exchanges. 
A company can choose to go to either of the two stock exchanges before late 2000
1.  
Since its establishment, the Chinese stock market has undergone a tremendous growth 
rate. By 2001, officials were claiming that the market had become Asia’s second 
largest and world’s eighth largest with an official capitalization of RMB 4.3 trillion or 
USD 524 billion (Green 2003); the number of listing companies increased to 1,378 by 
the end of March 2004. Because of the significant level of nonperforming loans in 
China’s banking sector, and limited size of the corporate bond market, the stock 
market has became the major channel of corporate finance in China. However, since 
1999 the stock market has been experiencing a downturn. According to China Daily, 
the country’s most recognised English newspaper. The Chinese stock market plunged 
to a five- year low in 9, September, 2004 despite the nearly double digit growth rate 
of the booming Chinese economy.   
An important feature of the listed companies in the Chinese stock markets is that the 
ownership structure is divided into negotiable publicly owned shares and non- 
negotiable shares. The former includes A- shares
2, B- shares
3, H- shares or red- 
shares which are listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange and N- shares which are listed 
in New York Stock Exchange. The latter includes: 1) state owned shares
4; 2) state 
                                                 
1 New shares are only allowed to be listed in the Shanghai stock exchange since late 2000. 
2 .A - Shares are denominated in RMB and can only be purchased by domestic investors 
3  B - Shares are denominated in either US$ (SHSE) or HK$ (SZSE), and can only purchased by 
overseas investors before February 19, 2001. After February 19, 2001, the government implemented a 
new policy in opening up the B-share market to domestic individual investors with foreign currency 
holdings. 
4 State owned shares: state shares are shares formed from investment by state authorized investment 
departments or institutions with state assets. 
  4owned legal personal shares
5; 3) legal person shares
6; 4) employee shares
7. The non- 
negotiable shares compose about two- third of all shares outstanding
8. The state 
ownership structure is one of the unique structures of China’s stock market and has 
been criticized as it causes moral hazard and market inefficiency. Because only a 
small portion of shares are tradeable, company managers do not have to worry that 
poor management may cause the companies stock prices to fall, or their companies 
will be faced with the threat of being taking over.  
China did not have a security law until 1998. The establishment of a security law in 
1998 indicates that the Chinese government has firmly committed to reform the stock 
market by introducing market- driven practice. The rules of initial public offering 
have significantly changed since then. The offering rules have three major areas: 1) 
offering condition; 2) offering method; 3) offering pricing methods. We discuss each 
in detail:  
  Offering condition: Before 2000, a policy- driven quota system was used. The 
aggregate amounts of companies going to the public were under the budget of the 
State Planning Commission and the CSRC. The quota then allocated to each province, 
national ministries and commissions, who recommend which could go public. The 
weakness of this system is that it encourages potential issuers to engage in rent- 
seeking activity and causes inefficient allocation of resources. In 2000, the CSRC 
replaced the old quota system with a new verification system. Since that time book 
building
9 became popular in China. Under the new system, the qualified investment 
banks can recommend firms to the CSRC for issuing and listing. Compared with the 
old system, this new system aims to use investment banks expertise to improve the 
quality of issuing firms. However, the CSRC still does the final verification.  
  Offering method: This is the most creative area of the Chinese primary market. 
Throughout time many methods have evolved and disappeared such as privatization 
offering, limited number or unlimited number of application forms, offering by 
                                                 
5 State owned legal person shares are those shares held by state owned enterprise 
6 Legal person shares are those shares held by corporate enterprises or public institutions and social 
bodies with legal person shares 
7 Employee shares are held by companies’ employees and generally non-tradeable until 6 months after 
listing. 
8 Although the total market capitalization is RMB 39,031.39, the market capitalization of negotiable 
shares is only RMB 12,223.73. We conclude that the negotiable shares only account one third of all 
shares outstanding 
9 On August, 31, 2004, CSRC released a draft of the new IPO pricing regulation on its website, 
introducing more- market driven practices and transparency in the IPO pricing process – a pure 
bookbuilding (currently the final price must be decided by the CSRC).  
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subscription according to lot drawing, subscription with special deposits, a 
combination of special deposits and subscription by lot drawing and payment in full 
with online offering etcetera. The weakness of those offerings is the cost inefficiency 
as they require a prepayment in full before the allocation of shares, which represents 
an opportunity cost for investors. As a result, in 1999, the CSRC invented two quick 
safe and low- cost offering methods – online price fixing and prepayment in full with 
proportional subscription and balance immediately refunded. The new shares are 
allocated to valid subscribers through a lottery mechanism
10. In the same year, the 
CSRC stipulated that companies with capital of over 400 million RMB or 48.78 
billion USD could adopt the stock offering method of combining online offerings to 
ordinary investors and placements to legal persons. This cap was removed in April, 
2000 and any IPO companies could place stocks to legal persons. On February 13, 
2000, the CSRC released its notice about placing new shares to secondary market 
investors based on their market value in the market. This method was then put into 
effect on 19, May, 2002 and has become the most used offering method in China’s 
primary market. The investors with the existing secondary market position are eligible 
to subscribe for the new shares after the share placement to strategic investors and 
legal persons. An existing market value of RMB 10,000 gives the rights to buy 1,000 
new shares.  In the case of over subscription, the lottery mechanism
11 based on 
market value will be used; in the case of under subscription the residual shares will be 
sold to the general public through online offering.  
  Offering pricing method: At the early stage of the securities market, companies 
had no rights to decide the P/E ratio in pricing the new offerings. A relatively fixed 
and lower than market P/E is determined by the CSRC. China reformed its pricing 
method in 1994 when the fixed price offering became the most used pricing method in 
China although competitive bidding offering has since been adopted. Under the fixed 
price method, the lead underwriter and issuer set an issuing price for the new issue 
within the state stipulated price range by using net earnings per share (E/S) 
multiplying by a capped regulatory P/E ratio. At the end of 1995 the E/S ratio was 
                                                 
10 Lottery mechanism is often used in the over-subscription circumstance. Investors have to apply for a 
lot to get rights for IPO. A lot is 1,000 shares. In China, the effective application order must be 1,000 
shares or integral multiplier of 1,000. So, if an investor asks for 5,000 shares, he will own 5 lottery 
numbers. The lottery numbers are drawn randomly and the corresponding number will be allocated a 
fraction of 1,000 shares 
  
  6reset as the average of the prior year E/S ratio and forecast current year E/S ratio. In 
March 1997 the E/S ratio was replaced by the average E/S ratios of the past three 
years. In February 1998 the E/S was redetermined as the forecast earnings divided by 
the current year weighted average number of shares
12. In July 1999, in response to the 
Securities Law, the CSRC emphasised that the pricing method must be linked with the 
secondary market.  An artificial book building pricing method was introduced into the 
China IPO market. The company and the underwriters determine the offering price 
depending on the demand from the secondary market for these particular shares. It is 
artificial because the finalised offering price must be within the regulator’s pricing 
range and must be verified by the CSRC.  
 
3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
According to our literature review, although there have been a number of working 
papers devoted to the mechanisms’ driving Chinese IPO underpricing there are few  
papers published in well- known finance journals. To date, those studies have been 
suggestive, but not conclusive. Further research is needed as the on- going liberation 
of the Chinese IPO market may mean the underpricing effect is evolving over time. 
The asymmetric information model is the most employed in explaining A- share 
underpricing. According to the efficient market hypothesis the share price should 
reflect all the information available in the market. However, there is limited 
information about the potential issuing companies per se except those in the 
companies’ prospectus. An information asymmetry degree of those new issuing 
companies is relatively higher than those of already listed companies. Another 
characteristic of China’s financial market is its poor accounting and auditing 
standards. The scandals  of companies cooking their financial statements are 
constantly reported in the market. As the only information resource for investors, the 
prospectuses are more unreliable than those in countries with higher accounting and 
auditing standards. Due to the high degree of asymmetric information, investors may 
face a winner’s curse problem or investment risk. Issuers may underprice new 
unseasoned shares to encourage uninformed investors to participate in the offering. 
High quality issuers may signal the market by underpricing in order to divert the 
investor’s attention and recoup the cost of underpricing from subsequent seasoned 
                                                 
12 The current year weighted average number of shares = [total number of shares before offering + 
number of current public offering shares*(12- offering month)/12] 
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Firth and Kim (2003) support the winner’s curse hypothesis as the degree of the 
asymmetric information and ex- post risk is strongly related to the underpricing. Su 
and Fleisher (1998) and Chen, Firth and Kim (2003) supplied evidence to show the 
theoretical relationship between the number of seasoned equity offerings and the 
underpricing in China’s primary market. However empirical evidence finds the 
operating performance actually deteriorates post- IPO, Chan, Wei and Wang (2004). 
Thus, arguably the issuers have no incentive to underprice the new shares to signal 
their potential quality. Chi and Padgett (2005) argued the degree of Chinese IPO 
underpricing was primarily explained by the inequality between supply and demand. 
During privatization the government does not send signals on quality of the issues.  
Liu (2003) finds theories based on information asymmetries can not well explain the 
extremely high A- share underpricing in 1999- 2002.  
Some studies linked the unique offering mechanism in explaining A- underpricing. 
The political government sets ‘the rules of the game’ as quick market growth and 
raising capital for SOEs at the earlier stage of market development. Yang (2003) finds 
that the quota system used at the early stage of the market development causes the 
imbalance between the demand and supply of new shares. Investors, who are only 
allocated a small portion of their demand through the lottery mechanism, will ask for 
more in the secondary market due to the high underpricing feature of the A- share. 
That causes a bandwagon effect and pushes the initial offering price to an 
extraordinary level. In his paper, Liu (2003) argues that the A- share underpricing is 
the result of allocation methods which cause overpricing in the secondary market. 
Studies have found a strong negative relationship between the odds of winning lottery 
(lottery rate) and A- share underpricing. Also, the P/E ratios in pricing new shares in 
the primary market have appeared to be significantly less than those in the secondary 
market.  
 
4: DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
4.1 Data 
We investigate a sample of 293 Chinese A- share IPOs listed either at the SHSE or the 
SZSE, from 1 January 2000 to end of April 2003. Our primary focus is on the 2003 
period data, which contains 47 IPOs. We further separate the sample data into two 
sub- periods: 2000- 2002 and 2003 to capture characteristics of the underpricing 
  8change. We use Guo Tai An (GTA) Information Technology’s China IPO database. 
Although there are about 355 companies listed during our sample period, 67 
companies are listed in 2003. However, we find the data base suffers from missing 
information important in the modelling exercise. After correction our finalized sample 
size is 293. Firms in the final dataset are free of unexpected announcement effects. 
Table 1 summarises the number of IPOs that went to market during our sample 
period. There are no new shares listed in the SZSE in 2003 since the SZSE was not 
allowed to list new shares after late 2000. 
<Table 1 about here> 
Two pricing methods are used during our sample period. Book building was allowed 
for pricing the new unseasoned shares since 2000. To capture the popularity of book 
building in China, we summarized and reported the number of book building method 
used and the number of the fixed pricing method used in Table 2. While book 
building was introduced four years ago it has very limited frequency in pricing 
Chinese IPOs. The fixed pricing method has been used exclusively for the 2003 
sample.  
<Table 2 about here> 
Another important evaluation in the Chinese IPO market is the allocation method 
discussed in section 2. Table 3 summarises the number of different allocation methods 
used during our sample period. During 2000-2003, the on- line offering method is still 
the major allocation method since the secondary market placement method was 
introduced in middle- 2002. The placement method started to gain priority in 2003, in 
which 93.62% of the new offerings used the secondary market placement method.  
  <Table 3 about here> 
Other key statistics of the important variables in explaining A- share underpricing are: 
• The average lag between the issuing and the offering is 17 days in 2003, which 
represents an average 10 days decrease compared with 27 days in 2000- 2002.  
• The IPO pricing P/E ratio in 2003 is 19.59%, which represents an average 
5.69% decrease comparing with 25.28% in 2000- 2002. 
• The IPO market P/E ratio on the first trading day in 2003 is 56.01%, which 
represents an significant average 48.49% decrease comparing with 104.5% in 
2000- 2002.  
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represents an average 5.15% decrease comparing with 55.9% in 2000- 2002.  
This evidence indicates the previous studies have been suggestive as to the 
effectiveness of the CSRC. While some studies argue the high initial return causing 
the investor funds to flow out from the secondary market, the CSRC has been 
working to bring down the pricing differences. The IPO pricing P/E ratio also 
decreased. Lucas and McDonald’s (1990) model suggests that if a bear market places 
too low a value on the issuing firm, then they will delay their IPOs until a bull market 
offers more favourable pricing. The CSRC always suspends the initial public offering 
when the market took a deep dive. Likewise, in the bear market, the value of the 
issuing firm should be further valued downwards, theoretically. Thus, given the bad 
performance of the secondary market in 2003, the IPO pricing P/E decrease is not 
surprising.  
4.2 Underpricing measurement  
We refer to the raw level of underpricing or the initial trading day raw returns as the 
difference between the closing prices on the first day of trading and the initial offering 
price divided by the initial offering price. To take off the effect of the market return, 
the market- adjusted return adjusts the initial trading day return by the change in the 
market index between initial public offering and listing. Both raw returns and market- 
adjusted returns are calculated on a daily basis.  The raw and market- adjusted returns 
of IPO share i are given by: 












1 , in which:                                                                      (1)                                
= Ri  the raw return of IPO i on the first trading day 
1 i P = the closing price of IPO i on the first trading day 
0 i P = the offering price of IPO i  









− = in which:                                 (2) 
= MARi  the market- adjusted abnormal return of IPO i on the first trading day; 
= Ri  the raw return of IPO i on the first trading day; 
1 i I = the closing index on the first trading day; 
0 i I = the opening index on the first trading day.  
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share underpricing in 2003 is 76.14% with a market adjusted initial return 76.64% 
compared with the underpricing in 2000-2002 which is 143.10% with a market 
adjusted initial return 142.59%. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the average 
market return on the first trading day in 2003 is negative despite the high IPO returns. 
It indicates that the market is experiencing a ‘bear market’. 
 
5: ESTIMATED A- SHARE UNDERPRICING MODEL  
 5.1 Estimated model 
To test our hypothesis, an estimated model based on previous studies is developed. In 
this subsection, we modify Liu (2003)’s A- share underpricing model. The reasons for 
choosing this model are 1) we both use the GTA’s China IPO data base; 2) we both 
believe the extremely high A- share underpricing is mainly due to the trading activity 
in the secondary market; 3) Liu (2003)’s sample period is from 1, January 1999 to 31, 
December 2002, which is consistent with our sample but we start at 2000 and include 
an updated database of 2003 data. 
The independent variables and hypothesised relationships with the dependent variable 
Market Adjusted Return ( ) are defined as follows:  i MAR
Proxies for asymmetric information:  
i IPOSIZE     The logarithm of market value of an IPO and negatively related 
to the A-share underpricing.  
i PubOwn   The percentage of tradeable shares of an IPO after listing and 
negatively related to the A-share underpricing.  
i ROE   The previous year’s return on equity of the issuer and positively 
related to the A-share underpricing.  
Hypothesis Development:  Due to the issuer’s asymmetric information, investors are 
confronted with the winner’s curse problem and ex- post uncertainty. Based on the 
asymmetry information hypothesis, we hypothesises 1) The greater the offering size  
the lower the probability of after- market manipulation and less ex- post uncertainly.  
IPOs with the greater offering size should be less underpriced.  2) The greater the 
percentage of tradeable shares indicates less information asymmetry, greater the 
market discipline and stronger after-listing corporate governance. IPOs with the 
greater percentage of tradeable shares should be less underpriced. 3) The greater the 
  11return on equity indicates the better quality of the issuer. The higher quality issuer is 
more likely to signal its quality by underpricing.   
Proxies for offering method: 
i ice FixPr   Dummy variable for pricing method:  = 1 if fixed price method 
used; otherwise = 0. The fixed pricing method underprices A-
share IPOs more than book building. 
Hypothesis Development: As Liu (2003) found that when the book building method is 
used, the underwriter adjusted the offering price upwards for almost all IPOs, which 
are initially priced using the fixed pricing method. This indicates that underpricing is 
more severe when the fixed pricing methods are used.  
Proxies for bandwagon effect 
i MarketPE   The secondary market P/E ratio of an IPO on the first trading day 
is hypothesised to be positively related to the underpricing. 
i IPOPE    The P/E ratio used to pricing the offering price of an IPO and 
negatively related to the underpricing.  
Turnover  The market turnover in the first trading day, which refers to the 
trade frequency on the first trading day and is the ratio of trade 
volume of the first trading day to the number of tradeable shares 
following the initial public offering. The market turnover of an 
IPO is expected to be positively related to the underpricing.  
Hypothesis Development: As we discussed in Section 2, the initial offering price 
equals the current year forecast earnings multiplying a P/E within the regulator’s 
pricing range. Liu (2003) contributed a new explanation for A- share underpricing: 
the underpricing is the result of over- pricing in the secondary market. He argues that 
the greater the market P/E ratio the greater the underpricing level. Also, the lower 
pricing P/E ratio encourages higher demand and then higher market turnover. We 
argue that the ‘bandwagon effect’ is a function of A- share underpricing – investors 
buy those new shares disregarding their information, they solely depend on the market 
demand for those shares, which pushes the underpricing to an extremely high level. 
We found that using lottery rate and lottery money as proxies for allocation method is 
troublesome. In the case in which on- line + placement methods are used there will be 
two lottery rates, one is based on money and one is based on market value. Thus, 
  12which lottery rate should be selected? We modified the model by setting a dummy 
variable for the allocation method.  
Proxy for allocation method 
i k IPOAM ) (   Allocation method dummy: In Model 1, k = 1,2,3,4 or in Model 
2, k= 1, 2, 3 where 1 represents Online allocation; 2 represents 
placement allocation; 3 represents the combination of online 
allocation and placement allocation; 4 represents other allocation  
    methods. 1= yes, 0= no.  
Previous studies show that the lottery mechanism is significantly related to the A-
share underpricing. Using the lottery rate as the proxy, studies found the lower the 
lottery rate, the higher the underpricing. The reason is that the low lottery rate is due 
to the high level of oversubscription. Investors who were not allocated shares in the 
first place tend to buy new shares after listing due to the significant level of new share 
underpricing in China. Furthermore, most of those investors act as ‘flippers’, who buy 
and sell the new shares on the first trading day. Liu (2003) indicates the primary 
market and the secondary market are segmented in China. The funds in the primary 
market do not flow to the secondary market. To stimulate the primary market funds 
flowing into the secondary market the CSRC enforced the placement allocation 
method in 19, May 2002. The new method gives the investors with the existing 
secondary market positions propriety to subscribe for new shares. In detail: a market 
value of RMB 10,000 makes a investor eligible to apply for 1,000 shares (a lot) while 
under the on- line allocation method investors have to subscribe for new shares based 
on real money. Given the fact that the investors have to spend a portion of their funds 
to acquire a position in the secondary market, the funds available for new share 
acquisition are relatively smaller. Thus, the lottery rate under the placement should be 
relatively lower than straight on- line offering. There have been several cases in which 
new shares are undersubscribed under the placement method.  That is why the online+ 
placement method was introduced. When the new shares are undersubscribed from 
the placement allocation, the underwriters have to take stand-by underwriting to sell 
the residual shares through on- line offering. A lower demand for certain IPOs 
indicates that those shares are not favoured by the investors. Arguably, investors will 
underprice those shares even more to engage investors participating in the 
unfavourable offering. However, if there is low market demand for those particular 
  13shares, there will be less post- listing chasing or less bandwagon effect. We 
hypothesise that the allocation method is related to A- share underpricing.   
We use the natural logarithmic of the market- adjusted return to reduce non-normality 
and heteroskedasticity. Moreover, in contrast to the 2000- 2002 sample in which four 
IPO allocation methods and two pricing methods are used, our 2003 sample only 
includes three allocation methods and 1 pricing method. Thus, we developed our 
estimated model 1 for 2000- 2002 sample and estimated model 2 for 2003 sample 
separately. Our finalized estimated models are: 
Model 1 for 2000- 2002 
ε β β β β
β β β β β
+ + + + +
+ + + + =
i i i i
i i i i i
Turnover IPOPE MarketPE ice Fix
k IPOAM ROE PubOwn IPOSIZE MAR
8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0
Pr
) ( ) ln(
                 (3) 
Model 2 for 2003 
ε β β β
β β β β β
+ + + +
+ + + + =
i i i
i i i i i
Turnover IPOPE MarketPE
k IPOAM ROE PubOwn IPOSIZE MAR
7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0 ) ( ) ln(
                  (4) 
5.2 Model Application  
In this subsection, we apply the estimated model to two sub- periods of our sample: 
the first sub- period is 2000-2002; the second sub- period is 2003. Given the changes 
to allocation method, documented earlier, we conducted a modified Chow test for 
structural break over the two sub-samples. The calculated value of the F- statistic is 
6.923604. Given the critical values of the F  = 2.32 and F = 1.83, we 
rejected the null hypothesis of no structural break at both 0.01 and 0.05 significance 
levels. Thus, the parameters of the 2003 A- share underpricing are different from 
those of the 2000 – 2002 underpricing function. Model parameter estimates are 
discussed separately.    
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Table 4 reports our testing results: the left- hand side half of the table presents the 
results for the 2000-2002 period; the right- hand side half of the table presents the 
results for the 2003 period.  
Estimated results for 2000- 2002 
The adjusted R square of the estimated model in this period is 63.69%. The A- share 
underpricing is significantly positively related to the market P/E ratio and the first 
trading day market turn over ratio. The results confirm that the A- share underpricing 
is the result of overpricing by the secondary market. The offering size is significant 
negatively related to the A- share underpricing in this period. It implies that large 
  14offerings are subject to less underpricing as the relatively low level of ex- post 
uncertainly compared with small size offering. It may also imply that large offering is 
associated with low levels of oversubscription, and thus low levels of underpricing. 
Our finding shows a significant positive relationship between the fixed pricing and 
underpricing, which implies the book building does actually decrease the A- share 
underpricing level.  
<Table 4 about here> 
We did not find the allocation mechanism is significantly related to the A-share 
underpricing. However, the coefficients of the allocation methods do signal that the 
online+ placement underprice IPOs more than the other methods although it is 
insignificant. It implies the undersubscribed IPOs tend to be more underpriced than 
those oversubscribed IPOs. 
 Estimated results for 2003  
The goodness of fit of the estimated model in this period decreased and provides an  
adjusted R square of 50.85%.  The results show that the percentage of tradeable 
shares, market P/E ratio and the market turnover on the first trading day are 
significant and positively related to the A- share underpricing in 2003.  
Also, as distinguished from the 2000- 2002 results, the percentage of tradeable shares 
became significant and positively related to the underpricing but the issuing size   
insignificant and not related to the underpricing. We can not conclude the offering 
size has became insignificant and not related to the A- share underpricing, but we 
suspect there is a structural break in 2003.   
5.3 The expanded model 
We propose an expanded model to capture additional effects from the underwriters 
side. This general model is over specified in order to minimize the likelihood of 
parameter bias from exclusion of relevant variables. The downside is potential loss of 
degrees of freedom implying significant results are very significant and marginally 
significant results of interest.  
While papers have focused on the issuers’ side, very limited attention has been 
directed to the underwriters’ side. The reason is the underwriters’ lack of 
discretionary power in shares allocation. Since 2000 bookb uilding has been allowed 
in China. Now underwriters have been given rights to recommend which firm should 
be listed and determine the preliminary offer prices range and revise the offer price 
according to the market demand. Under Section 21 of China’s Securities Law, three 
  15underwriting methods are allowed: 1) stand- by underwriting, under which 
underwriters are liable to meet the shortfall in demand by purchasing the unsubscribed 
shares at the offer price; 2). Firm- commitment underwriting, under which the 
underwriters purchase outright the securities being offered by the issuers, who then 
switch all the offering risk to underwriters; 3) best- effort underwriting, under which 
the underwriters have the option to buy and authority to sell securities, or if 
unsuccessful, may cancel the issue and forgo any fees. The stand- by underwriting is 
similar to the firm commitment basis of underwriting except the latter requires the 
underwriter to purchase the issue upfront, repackage the issue and sell it to the public 
(Janice and Julian, 2000). In practice, the firm- commitment is the most used 
underwriting method in China. Under firm- commitment method the underwriters 
typically buy the IPO shares from the issuers at the offer price less a spread, which is 
agreed well in advance of the offer price being fixed and typically is set as a fraction 
of the offer price. A high spread certainly leads the underwriters to expend greater 
effort, resulting in high risk for underwriters. Thus, they may have conflicts of interest 
with issuers, and minimize their risk at the expense of the issuers. While the high 
level of A-share underpricing has given an easy life to underwriters, the online+ 
placement allocation indicates that the underwriting business is no longer risk- free as 
the underwriters are challenged with under- subscriptions
13. 
By determining the underwriters’ fee upfront, on the percentage of the offering price, 
issuers link their loss with the underwriters. In other words, while the underwriters 
underprice the new shares, they decrease their underpricing spreads at the same time. 
Thus, we hypothesise that high underwriters fees leads to less underpricing and are 
negative related to the A- share underpricing.  
We also hypothesise that underwriters with higher reputation capital tend to charge 
higher underwriting fees and this is associated with less underpricing. We use a 
dummy variable for the underwriters’ reputation. We stratify by using the top 10 
underwriters by market share in 2003. These top 10 maintained 65.4% of underwriter 
market share in 2003. If the lead underwriter of IPO is in our top 10 list, the dummy 
variable has a value of 1, 0 otherwise and negatively related to the A-share 
underpricing.  
                                                 
13 In 2004, there have been several cases where IPOs with a closing price less than the offering price on 
the first trading day.  
  16It could also be argued that higher issue price is more likely to have a prolonged issue 
period and a greater chance of the underwriter suffering from capital loss in the event 
of under- subscription. The result is that underwriters are more likely to set high fees 
for the high issue price IPOs. In line with the conflicts of interest hypothesis and 
asymmetric information hypothesis, we hypothesise that new offerings with large 
offering prices should be less underpriced and negatively related the A- share 
underpricing.  
We also add another independent variable – Lag, which is the lag between the initial 
offering and the listing, to increase the explanation power of our model. We argue that 
it is an important function of IPO underpricing. The opportunity cost and investment 
risk is increasing as the length of the lag increases. Investors should ask for extra 
premiums for their investment. Using lag as control variable, we hypothesise that the 
lag is negatively related to the A- share underpricing.  
The model: 
ε β β β
β β β β β
β β β β β
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+ + + + + +
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             (5) 
Proxies  
) ( i Ufees Log   The logarithm of the total underwriting expenses of the security i 
i URPU    A dummy variable for the underwriter’s reputation: it =1 if the 
lead underwriters are in the Top ten list; it = 0 if the lead 
underwriters are not in the Top Ten list 
i URPU Ufees Log * ) (  The logarithm of the total underwriting expenses of the security 
i multiplying the underwriters reputation 
i OP      The offering price of the security i 
i Lag      The lag between the initial offering and the listing  
Table 5 summarises the regression results. The adjusted R squares for our enlarged 
(unrestricted) model explains 56% of the variation in China’s A- share underpricing in 
2003. It shows an improvement in goodness of fit of 6% compared with the 
previously estimated (restricted) model for the 2003 data. This unrestricted model has   
significant F calculated value (2.509) compared with the restricted model at the 5% 
critical F value (2.506).  
  17We find a significant negative relationship between the underwriters’ fees and the A- 
share underpricing, which supports the conflicts of interest hypothesis. A 1% increase 
in the underwriters’ fees will lead to an expected decrease in the underpricing by 
0.7%.  It indicates that high underwriting fees lead the underwriters to have less 
incentive to underprice new IPO shares. As the underwriting fees are set upfront at the 
percentage of offering price, a large underpricing will make the underwriters subject 
to lost underwriting fees. The offering price is not significantly related to the A- share 
underpricing at the 10% level of significance. However the degrees of freedom are 
low in this model so that a negative coefficient indicates the higher issuing price has 
less underpricing, which is consistent with the conflicts of interest hypothesis in the 
Chinese IPO market. However, we did not find a significant relationship between the 
underwriter’s reputation and A-share underpricing.   
<Table 5 about here> 
Secondary market overpricing still exists in China. The secondary market P/E ratio on 
the first trading day is significantly positively related to the A- share underpricing. It 
indicates that the offering price has been set lower than the market price. Also, the 
key statistics show that the market P/E ratio on the first trading day has declined 
significantly by nearly 50%. It indicates that the effects of the CSRC have been 
working to cover the pricing gap between the primary market and the secondary 
market. Furthermore, the market turnover ratio gives the best explanation in both the 
estimated model and our model. In our model, a 1% increase in the market turnover 
leads to an expected 1.83% increase in the A- share underpricing level. A general 
perception is that the large volume in Initial Public Offerings is mostly due to 
‘flippers’ that are allocated shares in the offering and immediately resell them 
(Aggarwal, 2003). The allocation of these extra shares boosts the aftermarket demand 
for the stock (Ritter and Welch, 2002).  
No significant relationship has been found between the allocation method and the A- 
share underpricing. It implies that the object of the regulation change of the allocation 
method is to flow the funds from the primary market into the secondary market, but 
not to reduce the A- share underpricing level.  
IPO offering size, the percentage of the tradeable shares and return on equity are not 
significantly related to the A- share underpricing in 2003. It indicates that asymmetric 
information may not apply to the Chinese IPO market post 2002. However, because 
of the small sample size of IPOs available in the 2003 database these insignificant 
  18results should be interpreted with caution. Further studies could be undertaken with an 
expanded database post 2002.    
 
6: CONCLUSION   
This paper investigates the China’s A- share underpricing. In 2003, the mean raw 
initial public return is 76.14% and the mean market adjusted initial public return is 
76.64%. Compared with the results of the previous studies, a significant decline is 
found in 2003.  
As the result of the continuous regulation changes in the Chinese primary market this 
paper argues that the previous models may not provide an adequate fit to the 2003 
data. A test model based on previous studies of Chinese IPOs is modified and applied 
in both 2000- 2002 data and 2003 data. The test results show that the explanatory 
power of the previous model in 2003 is significantly decreased by nearly 13%. A 
modified Chow’s test was implemented to test the equality of the regression model in 
two sample periods. The results show a structural break in the Chinese primary 
market by using the estimated model. 
A new model was developed to identify the functions of A- share underpricing in 
2003. The new model leads to an expected increase in the explanatory power of 6%. 
Conflicts of interest between the underwriters and the issuers were explored. The 
regression results show a significantly negative relationship between the underwriters’ 
fees and the A- share underpricing. Although underwriters may have incentives to 
underprice the IPO shares to decrease their marketing efforts and/or increase their 
future business opportunities, issuers can reduce their agency cost by contracting with 
the underwriters by setting the underwriters’ fee as a percentage of the offering price 
before the initial public offering. 
The secondary market activities after the initial public offering are still the main 
contributors to the A- share underpricing. The P/E ratio on the first trading day is 
significantly positively related to the underpricing despite a significant decline in the 
market P/E ratio in 2003 compared with those in previous years. The market turnover 
contributes most to A- share underpricing. The high trading volume may be because 
of the high level of flipping activities on the first trading day. While the placement 
method was introduced by the CSRC, it still applies the old inefficient lottery 
mechanism and does not delegate any description power to the underwriters in IPO 
allocation. In many mature markets such as U.S.A and U.K., the underwriters have 
  19description powers in the share allocation, which have proved effective in preventing 
the ‘flipping’ activities.  
The news release indicates that the pricing difference between the primary market and 
the secondary market will be further reduced if a more- market driven practice is 
enforced. Consequently, A- share underpricing should be further reduced after the 
implementation of the new regulation. Our sample data shows under-subscription has 
already appeared in the Chinese primary market, a further decrease in A- share 
underpricing will lead to more under- subscription.  
The on-going liberation of the Chinese IPO market provides an interesting area of 
study. The previous studies in the Chinese IPO underpricing have been suggestive but 
inconclusive. Whilst we found the asymmetric information hypothesis does not apply 
in the Chinese IPO market post 2002, future studies should focus on the IPO 
allocation and the aftermarket activities of the related parties in the offering: the 
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  22Table 1: Number and percentage of IPOs in our sample 
           
   Year  Total  SHSE  SZSE    
 2000-2002  246  203  43    
     100%  82.52%  17.48%    
 2003  47  47  0    
     100%  100%  0    
 2000-2003  293  251  43    




Table 2: Number of IPO by pricing method 
       
 Year  Total Fixed  Pricing  Bookbuilding 
2000-2002 246  205  41 
   100%  83.33%  16.67% 
2003 47  47  0 
   100%  100%  0 
2000-2003 293  252  41 




Table 3: Number of IPO by allocation method 
 
This table provides the number of IPOs going public based on the allocation method. On- line 
offering means allocation of new shares through lottery mechanism; Placement means allocation of 
new shares to the secondary market investors based on their market value; on- line + placement 
means allocation of new shares through on- line offering after the placement to the secondary 
market investors; it is used when the new shares is undersubscribed  in the placement offering. 
 Year  Total  On-line  Placement 
On-line+ 
Placement  Others 
2000-2002 246  150  43  49  4 
   100%  60.98%  17.48%  19.92%  1.62% 
                  
2003 47  1  44  2  0 
   100%  2.13%  93.62%  4.25%  0 
                  
2000-2003 293  152  87  51  4 





  23Table 4 Regression results for two sub- sample periods 
This table provides the regression results of the estimated models. The left- hand side half of the table 
provides the regression results after applying the model 1 in the 2000-2002 sample data; the right- 
hand side half of the table provides the regression results after applying the model 2 in the 2003 
sample data. The asterisks ** and * indicate significance at the 1% (2 tailed) and 5% level (2 tailed) 
respectively. 
 2000-2002  2003 
   Coefficient   t  P-value   Coefficient  t  P- value 
Intercept 1.681324  4.366772** 1.89E-05  -2.01303  -2.24632**  0.030576
IPOAM1 -0.04267  -0.19753  0.843585      
IPOAM2 -0.22351  -1.00469  0.316079 -0.17212 -0.35689  0.723149
IPOAM3 0.293594  1.343254 0.180485 -0.80691 -1.26525  0.213487
IPOSIZE -1.40025  -12.1577**  1.05E-26 -0.10436  -0.39368  0.696014
Pub-Own 0.147827  0.446261  0.655819 1.198924  2.164969**  0.036736
ROE -0.44251  -1.61022  0.108693 0.074417  0.12082  0.90447 
IPOPE -0.00145 -0.52902  0.597294 -0.01442 -0.81293  0.421322
MarketPE 0.001592  3.474699** 0.000609 0.015146  3.817492**  0.000483
Turnover 1.085739  4.900873** 1.78E-06 1.786084  2.814634**  0.007695
FixPrice  0.13025  1.730423*  0.084867         
Adjusted R Square   0.636901    0.508463
Std. Error of the Estimate  0.412319    0.464095
Sum Squared Residual   39.95169    8.184604
F- statistics  43.97476    6.947996















  24Table 5: Regression Results 
 
This table provides the regression results after applying our 
enlarged model in the 2003 sample. The asterisks ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1% (2 tailed) and 5% (2 tailed)  
level respectively 
  Coefficient t Stat  P- value 
Intercept -0.92642  -0.73303  0.468879
IPOAM2 0.210464  0.305332  0.762091
IPOAM3 0.333902  0.70311  0.487071
IPOSIZE 0.362597  0.740095  0.464638
Pub-Own 1.175894  1.274663  0.211607
ROE 1.121686  1.388213  0.174662
IPOPE -0.00739  -0.40467  0.688415
MarketPE 0.012935  3.096647**  0.004052
Turnover 1.78342  2.630341**  0.013007
Log(Unfees) -0.71368  -2.00892**  0.053045
URPU 1.247943  0.656764  0.516028
Log(fee)*URPU -0.31947  -0.5201  0.606575
Lag -0.00659  -0.27036  0.78862 
offering price  -0.0539  -1.48499  0.147333
Adjusted R Square   0.561237
Standard Error   0.430496
Sum Squared Residual   5.930471
F- statistics   5.427781
Sig.         4.75E-05 
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